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TOWARD THE ANALYSIS OF THE MECHANISM 
OF CONTROL OVER MASS MEDIA IN UKRAINE 
The paper discusses the socio-political conditions of the functioning of mass media in inde­
pendent Ukraine. The data from interviews with journalists and media practitioners are used 
to buttress the thesis that the state has waged a war against mass media to insure effective 
control over them. 
Introduction 
After the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the 
end of the Leninist rule, the old Orwellian methods 
of suppression of freedom of speech in general and 
media in particular seemed to have gone forever. 
Mass media became a burgeoning market, and both 
members of emergent civil society as well as media 
community hoped that post-Soviet countries were on 
a way to Western standards of media freedom and 
independence. Democratic theorists emphasized the 
role of freedom of speech in constitution of modern 
civil society [1]. and constitutional state where the 
power, according to Hegel, derives its legitimacy 
«not at all from force, only to a small extent from 
habits and custom, [but] really from insight and ar­
gument» [2]. 
Nevertheless, these hopes were short-lived and 
never came into being in Ukraine. The political pen­
dulum of electoral/illiberal democracy oscillating 
between substantive, participatory democracy and 
authoritarianism, is swinging toward authoritarian 
backlash in those successive states of the former 
Soviet Union which were ruled by communist regime 
for more than 70 years. The nourishment of illiber-
al/delegative democracy in Ukraine has rendered the 
freedom of media only the value of declaration and 
rhetoric with little connection to reality. The rise of 
new post-Leninist political class — many observers 
have defined it as oligarchy — with its particularis­
tic interests which often contradicting those of broad­
er circles of a society led to the development of new 
strategies and techniques as far as subduing mass 
media is concerned. These strategies have often 
proved successful as far as suppression of media 
freedom is concerned. For instance, in 1999 New 
York based Committee to Protect Journalists recog­
nized President of Ukraine Mr. Kuchma a 6th worst 
enemy of the free press in a world in 1999, along 
with such notorious oppressors of free press as Pres­
ident Lukashenka of Belarus and President Milo-
shevic of Yugoslavia. This paper seeks to analyze 
how the state control over mass media in Ukraine has 
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developed in well established mechanism, resembling 
a full fledged war waged against journalists. The 
paper will explore the mechanism of control over 
media by examining the existing legal framework for 
their activities. The latter will be contrasted with real 
situation of the war waged by Ukrainian state against 
independent minded media and journalists. The pa­
per is making extensive use of survey data obtained 
during numerous polls as well as interviews with 
leading TV channels journalists. The paper is focus­
ing on the disappearance of oppositional journalist 
Georgy Gongadze as a paradigm example of state 
war against journalists. 
Legal Framework of Mass Media Activities 
in Ukraine 
Ukrainian student of mass media Valery Ivanov 
has pointed out that «Ukraine occupies the top posi­
tion among other Commonwealth of Independent 
States in terms of a number of laws devoted to reg­
ulating mass media. At the same time, making these 
laws enforceable leaves much to be desired» [3]. The 
activities of mass media in Ukraine are regulated by 
The Constitution of Ukraine, Laws of Ukraine, Con­
stitutional Court of Ukraine rulings, decrees and or­
ders of the President of Ukraine, decisions of the 
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. The Constitution of 
Ukraine adopted in 1996 officially outlawed censor­
ship (Article 15). At the same time, even Constitu­
tion contains a number of fundamental contradictions 
in articles dealing with freedom of speech and me­
dia, thus, mass media situation is unpredictable and 
volatile. Moreover, such contradictions provide state 
authorities and courts with an effective tool for cur­
tailing media freedom. For example, while Article 34 
of The Constitution of Ukraine stipulates that «eve­
ryone has the right to collect, preserve, use and dis­
seminate information orally or in any other form», 
Article 32 insists that «it is prohibited to collect, 
preserve, use and disseminate information on a per­
son without his/her consent, unless otherwise is stip­
ulated by the law». The ruling of the Constitutional 
Court of Ukraine of October, 1997 made matters 
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even more complicated since it upheld the Article 32 
ban on collection of personal information. Ivan Tym-
chenko, Constitutional Court of Ukraine Supreme 
Justice, thus commented the court's decision: «It is 
not aimed against journalists. In any case, I would 
recommend that journalists seek professional law-
yers' advice if they have doubts whether or not the 
information is confidential and its collection meth-
od is legal» [4]. Given that according to Ukrainian 
legislation confidential information includes informa-
tion on one's education, marital status, health, date 
and place of birth, religion, income, etc. it is diffi-
cult not to cross the line of what is allowed while 
making a news report or writing a newspaper feature. 
Another example of contradictory legislation on 
mass media, allowing encroachments on their free-
dom, is the President's executive order #419 «On 
Coordination of the Activities of Press Services and 
Information-Analytical Divisions of State Executive 
Power Bodies» issued in November 1995. The order 
stipulated that the hierarchy of press services of state 
executive power bodies be established. These press 
services are supposed to coordinate its activities con-
cerning information to be presented to mass media 
with the President of Ukraine press service. It is 
worth noting that though the Constitutions gives the 
President the right to establish «deliberative, consult-
ing and other supportive bodies and services» (Arti-
cle 106 (28)), the legal status of Presidential Admin-
istration has never been defined, thus, this institu-
tion's decisions can not have a binding power for 
other governmental/non-governmental bodies. 
Perhaps, the most graphic example of a relaxed 
attitude of Ukraine's power elite — the core of which 
is made up of executive branch members centered 
around President — to even existing imperfect laws on 
mass media activities was the refusal of National TV 
company of Ukraine to provide air time for the live 
broadcast of the speech of the then Chair of the Su-
preme Council of Ukraine Olexandr Tkachenko. This 
incident happened during presidential campaign of sum-
mer-fall 1999, and Mr. Tkachenko was one of contend-
ers for the position of a head of state and therefore could 
voice his criticism of Mr. Kuchma presidency. The re-
fusal to grant air time to the Parliament speaker was 
the direct violation of «The Law of Ukraine on the Pro-
cedure of the Coverage of the Activities of the Bodies 
of State Power and Bodies of Local Government in 
Ukraine by Mass Media», ironically, signed and thus 
enacted by Mr. Kuchma. The law in question stipulat-
ed that «at the request of the President of Ukraine, Chair 
of Supreme Council of Ukraine, Prime-minister of 
Ukraine, Supreme Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Ukraine and Supreme Justice of the Constitutional 
Court of Ukraine National TV Company must provide 
them with extraordinary air time for live broadcasting 
to deliver urgent official speeches» [5]. 
Above considerations confirm the assumption 
about the contradictory nature of Ukrainian legisla-
tion dealing with mass media. Such legal controver-
sies coupled with the lack of transparent and enforce-
able rules give power brokers in Ukraine an oppor-
tunity to manipulate the legislation to their advan-
tage, thus dramatically circumscribing declared free-
dom of media. 
Socio-political Conditions of Media Activities 
in Ukraine 
Recent survey conducted by the Ukrainian Ra-
zumkov Center for Economic and Political Studies 
exposed rather bleak situation with regard to media 
activities in Ukraine [6]. Students of Ukrainian mass 
media condition Mykola Sungurovsky and Ihor Zh-
danov [7] have identified the following strategies 
employed by the state and media outlets owners 
aimed at dramatically influencing the content of 
media's message: 
1. Attempts to introduce the political censorship — 
while the censorship is outlawed and no official in-
stitution vested with such a task exists, there has 
been witnessed a pluralization of dependencies of 
media on diverse political actors and institutions. 
Thus, being in opposition to the President and his 
entourage does not automatically mean being inde-
pendent. It is often a sign of dependency on tycoons 
who simply can afford a luxury of autonomous ac-
tion vis-a-vis head of state. The censorship is often 
exercised by media outlets founders. For example, 
Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine — state sup-
ported and controlled umbrella organization, a direct 
heir of Soviet-era trade unions — ceased to publish 
in 1999 «Profspilkovu gazetu» («Trade Union News-
paper») and «Profspilky» (magazine «Trade Un-
ions»), claiming that the activity of publications in 
question have contradicted founder's goals. The 
same situation exists as far as electronic media are 
concerned — most of nationwide TV channels are 
either owned by the state (which entails their direct 
control by Presidential arm of executive) or belong 
to individuals who support the policy of Mr. Kuch-
ma's regime. Besides, almost 70% of respondents of 
a nation wide poll conducted in October 2000 by 
Razumkov Center agreed that the censorship in Uk-
raine was a hard fact of life. 
2. Financial-economic pressure on mass media 
to influence/change their political orientation. The 
most popular and effective weapon employed by the 
state to exercise such a pressure is State Tax Admin-
istration. For example, in October 2000 the publica-
tion of the newspaper «Silski visti» («Village News») 
was stopped and newspaper's accounts were frozen 
on accusation of Ukr Hr 2 million tax arrears. Giv-
en that «Silski visti» is controlled by former Supreme 
Council Chair and unsuccessful contender in 1999 
presidential race Mr. Tkachenko, there are good rea-
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sons to believe that the assault against the newspa­
per was politically motivated. 
3. Interference of state executive power bodies 
into activities of judiciary reviewing law suites 
against media outlets. This intrusion is almost always 
hidden and takes place in «smoke filled back rooms» 
and only seldom occurs publicly. The rare example 
of a latter was a letter to Supreme Justice of the Su­
preme Court of Ukraine sent by Ukraine's Minister 
of Defense four star general Olexandr Kuzmuk who 
voiced his discontent with Court's decision not to 
proceed with one of Ministry of Defense subsidia­
ries suite against newspaper «Segodnia» («Today»). 
4. Another effective weapon to enforce control 
over journalists has been the use of libel suites against 
media outlets for defamation. In 1999 alone there were 
2258 suites against media in which plaintiffs (55 % 
of them were public servants) demanded payments 
totaling Ukr. Hr. 90 billion (this amount exceeds an­
nual budget of Ukraine more than fourfold). 
5. Last but not least, the use of physical violence 
against journalists has become common. Interestingly 
enough, opinion exhibited by experts surveyed by 
Razumkov Center, places underworld mobs and the 
President of Ukraine close to each other in terms of 
their potential danger to those journalists who dare 
criticize them (63% and 72% of experts respective­
ly thought that criticism of the President and crimi­
nal clans would lead to negative consequences for 
the journalist) [8]. 
Gongadze Case as a Reflection of Ukrainian 
Media Situation 
When asked what kind of negative consequenc­
es a journalist might face if he/she publishes critical 
piece on authorities activities, 68% of respondents 
thought that physical violence against the journalist 
was one of the most likely outcomes (see Sungu-
rovsky and Zhdanov 2001, p. 4). Public opinion of 
population at large is borne out by statistical evi­
dence — during 10 years of Ukraine's independent 
history dozens of journalists have been murdered, 
beaten up, threatened [9]. 
These developments reached the critical juncture 
with a disappearance on September 16, 2000 of 
Georgy Gongadze, free lance opposition journalists, 
head of Internet newspaper «Ukraińska pavda» 
(«Ukrainian Truth»), known for his vocal criticism 
of the President, his entourage and policies as well 
as coverage of Ukraine's power brokers alleged 
shady undertakings. The so-called «Gongadze case» 
is a paradigm example of how the nexus of state 
managers, business interests and organized crime 
exercises its influence — including the violence — 
to ensure the control over mass media. Despite the 
fact Mr. Gongadze was known in professional cir­
cles the political rational behind his disappearance 
was vehemently denied by authorities in general and 
law enforcers in particular. Ukrainians access to the 
Internet is limited — only 1 % of population has an 
opportunity to surf the web [10]. 
The case, most likely, would have dragged for­
ever and ended nowhere, like similar investigations 
into assassinations of other journalists, had not So­
cialist party leader Mr. Olexandr Moroz announced 
on November 28, 2000 to the Parliament that he 
possessed a tape, linking the President to the high 
profile case. The tapes were allegedly recorded by 
former Presidential bodyguard responsible for com­
munication security of the office of the President. 
The cassettes — if real — revealed a foul mouthed 
President who discussed with his chief of staff and 
Minister of Interior how to get rid of Georgy Gon­
gadze. The first independent-although unofficial — 
expertise conducted by Dutch Institute of Applied 
Scientific Research concluded that the tapes were 
unlikely to be fake though the poor quality of recor­
dings made impossible the identification of the voic­
es [11]. The second expertise conducted by Vienna 
based International Institute of Press was inconclu­
sive and suggested that events described on tapes be 
juxtaposed with reality. This solution is impossible, 
for chief law enforcement officers whose job would 
normally be to conduct such an investigation, are 
either themselves implicated in scandal or act under 
direct supervision of the President. The scandal took 
an unlikely direction when the author of recording 
former Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) officer in 
his video-recorded testimony to the Parliament on 
December 12, 2000 said that he was willing to testi­
fy in the court. He explained that he recorded the 
president's conversations using an ordinary digital 
Dictaphone that he had hidden under a sofa: «I start­
ed the moment when, while fulfilling my official 
duties, I became witness to a criminal order given by 
Leonid Kuchma; and only after I learned that this 
order had been fulfilled, I began to document further 
affairs» [12]. Melnychenko also said he had addition­
al proof that Kuchma ordered the head of the State 
Tax Administration Mykola Azarov, head of the Se­
curity Service Leonid Derkach and Interior Minister 
Yury Kravchenko to abolish opposition mass media 
outlets, such as newspapers «Silski visti» («Village 
News»), «Tovarysh» («Comrade»), «Hrani» («Brinks»), 
«Vechirni visti» («Evening news»), «Dzerkalo tyzh-
nia» («Mirror Weekly») and «Svoboda» («Liberty»), 
as well as radio stations BBC and Svoboda (Liber­
ty) [13]. In November 2000 two villagers found 
headless corpse whose bracelet and other jewelry 
were found belonging to Georgy Gongadze. (In a 
latest twist of the saga the U.S. State Department 
confirmed on April 16 that Major Mykola Melny­
chenko, who had been in hiding since releasing au­
dio tapes that allegedly link the President to the kil­
ling of Georgy Gongadze, sought and received asy-
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lum in US on April 13, 2001. Washington also grant-
ed asylum to Myroslava Gongadze, the journalist's 
28-year-old widow who had helped her husband in 
various projects). 
It is also worth noting that American system of 
checks and balances under which different branches 
of power compete with each other. Therefore, par-
liament as a cornerstone of every democratic polity 
is supposed either to dominate the executive or form 
a reform minded, while democratic opposition to the 
President. Ukrainian Parliament has failed to do so. 
Setting up an a Parliamentary investigative commis-
sion to probe into Gongadze case underlined the 
impotence of the legislature since the commission 
had no legal ground for its activities — the law on 
Parliamentary investigative commissions (such insti-
tution is envisaged in the Constitution) was vetoed 
by the President and Parliament was unable to over-
ride the veto. 
Behavior of authorities, following the recovery 
of the body, was a circumstantial evidence support-
ive of the theory about possible involvement of the 
President and his cronies into journalist's murder. 
Prosecutor General's office refused to recognize that 
professional motives could be behind Mr. Gongadze 
murder, insisting on purely «criminal» nature of the 
case. His relatives — mother and wife — were re-
fused a status of victims on a ground the violent 
death of Gongadze was not borne out by evidence. 
According to Ukrainian legislation, the victim's sta-
tus gives one an access to materials of investigation. 
Allowing Mr. Gongadze relatives access to informa-
tion collected by law enforcement agencies could 
shed an additional light on the role of major actors 
of the saga and thus was thought of as containing 
threat to the top members of Presidential entourage. 
It took authorities several months to run a DNA test 
of the remains of a body. Although Russian experts 
verdict was that there was 99.6 probability that the 
body was that of Gongadze (later the probability was 
upgraded to 99.9), the Prosecutor General refused to 
admit that the journalist was dead (Security Service 
of Ukraine, for example, was sending anonymous 
press releases to different newspapers, claiming that 
a man, resembling Gongadze, applied for the Czech 
visa and then was seen at one of Ukraine bank's 
branches in Prague while deputy Prosecutor Gener-
al Olexandr Bahanets — a person in charge of in-
vestigation — said that the results did not matter 
much, for the body could belong to some other rela-
tive of Gongadze's mother). Moreover, as late as on 
December 4, 2000 investigators claimed they had 
uncovered «evidence» that Gongsdze had died in an 
attempted robbery. No evidence has been made avail-
able to media ever since. 
In April 2001 another stance was used again — 
Olexandr Bahanets claimed that there was a witness 
who allegedly saw Gongadze in February 2001. 
Again no evidence was presented. Clumsy efforts of 
authorities to cover up the whole scandal only served 
to perpetuate it. As an example of a defense tech-
nique adopted by the President and his spin doctors 
could be Mr. Kuchma's statement that he did not 
know Gongadze personally despite the participation 
in a TV talk show during presidential race where 
Gongadze had an exchange with the President. Their 
pictures were taken, along with other journalists, 
after the discussion was over. 
The scandal has embodied all paradigm features 
of Ukrainian emergent political system with its se-
crecy, limited participation of a public in political 
life, wide gap between cynical and passive society 
and predatory political elites. The scandal has proved 
both the weakness of domestic sources of democra-
tization in Ukraine and unwillingness coupled with 
inability to comply with the norms expected of dem-
ocratic polity by Western advanced democracies. 
Ukrainian authorities were reluctantly bowing to 
external pressure only when it was exercised by or-
ganizations with solid economic and political levers 
of influence — like EU or US — while completely 
ignoring the opinion of trans-national NGOs and in-
stitutions like Parliamentary Assembly of the Coun-
cil of Europe. 
Empirical Evidence — Interviews With Jour-
nalists 
In order to test the hypothesis about systematic 
involvement of a state and its incumbents into repres-
sions against media, interviews with leading Ukrain-
ian TV reporters, news anchors as well as newspa-
per journalists were conducted. 
Seven TV journalists, representing 6 major na-
tion wide channels — ICTV, Inter, 1 + 1, STB, New 
Channel, First National Channel (all channels but 
First National Channel are in private hands) were 
interviewed. Volodymyr Skachko — a free lance 
journalist and Oleh Liashko — an editor-in-chief of 
the oppositional to the President weekly «Svoboda» 
(«Liberty») were interviewed. 
Out of 7 TV journalists interviewed 5 agreed to 
give comments on the situation with freedom of 
media in general and state role in repressions against 
journalists only on condition of an anonymity. This, 
I think, is a very telling sign of a climate of fear, 
surrounding Ukrainian journalists. I am analyzing 
media people answers below: 
1) Journalist from ICTV channel (anonymous 
interview). ICTV used to be owned by the US inves-
tor channel but the investor was squeezed out of 
Ukrainian market and the channel now is a property 
of Victor Pinchuk — Ukrainian oligarch who hap-
pens to be President's son-in-law. The journalist said 
that the institutionalized censorship does not exist in 
Ukraine but he admitted that the channel does have 
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set of rules how to cover politically sensitive issues. 
These rules have never been formulated and adopt­
ed, nevertheless, they exist informally, and channel's 
senior management makes sure that they are strictly 
observed. If the journalist somehow mangers to in­
clude into regular broadcast a piece critical of Presi­
dent and presidential arm of executive branch, he or 
she will inevitably be dealt with by channel manag­
ers who usually threaten a journalist with firing him/ 
her if the same thing ever happens again. The inter­
viewed journalist attributed the lack of autonomy of 
TV channels vis-a-vis the state to ill-developed mar­
ket of advertising — the net annual volume of ad­
vertising market in Ukraine does not exceed million 
30 US dollars, while in neighboring Poland it is more 
than 300 million US dollars. Thus, TV channels can 
hardly hope to be profitable entities staying above 
the fray — they are being purchased by Ukrainian 
power brokers with close ties to the state. Owners 
of mass media always have vested economic inter­
est and hidden political agendas. Most tycoons priv­
ileged position depends on their relations with the 
President and his entourage, therefore media outlets 
owners exercise direct control over the content of 
mass media message. 
The journalist also noticed that no enforceable 
and transparent rules regulating access to information 
exist — «One phone call of a channel owner can solve 
any problem» but without such support it is close to 
impossible to gain information from officials, espe­
cially if journalist is acting independently. 
Inter channel — controlled by Victor Medvedchuk 
and Hrihory Surkis — two tycoons who also head 
United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (the par­
ty has nothing to do with social democratic practice 
and ideology in Western sense and is used as an elec­
toral tool). The party and its leaders are close associ­
ates of the President. Alexy Mustafin of Inter — head 
of channel's analytical-information service claimed 
that he never experienced political censorship either 
inside or outside the channel. At the same time the 
channel is used by its owner as a tool in political 
struggles. The real situation of channel's dependen­
cy from its owners is reflected by criticism of Vic­
tor Yushchenko government who made an assault on 
oligarchs' position in economy in general and ener­
gy sector in particular. Mirroring his bosses position 
toward the government, Mr. Mustafin said that the 
Cabinet of Ministers headed by Victor Yushchenko 
is the most difficult institution as far as getting in­
formation is concerned. 
1+1 channel — influenced by Olexandr Volkov — 
close associate of the President accused of money 
laundering by Belgium authorities. Two representa­
tives of the channel were interviewed, all interviews 
were anonymous. One of the journalists said that 
Presidential administration had made an attempt at 
interfering into channel's affair and policy was not 
allowed to happen due to Mr. Volokov's political 
weight. Another employee claimed that 1 + 1 channel 
does not have any system of control over content of 
news reports while other channels do have institu­
tionalized censorship. Channel's employees have 
often been refused access to information by Minis­
try of Interior and Security Service but channel never 
went to court because of this. One of the journalist 
said that the channel's management had increased the 
pressure on journalists, demanding that they be as 
obedient and loyal to ruling regime as ICTV staff. 
Being an independent journalist in Ukraine means 
being jobless — this is the only way to achieve free­
dom from external control under current circum­
stances, said one of the journalists. When the chan­
nel's owner Olexandr Volkov temporally fell out of 
President's favor several months ago and began us­
ing his channel more independently from President's 
interests, Security Service of Ukraine was used in 
attempt to influence the channel and restore its loy­
alty to the President. One of channel's investor for­
mer Soviet and currently German citizen Boris Fuks-
man was barred from entering Ukraine. 
STB channel is controlled by Russian oil giant 
«Lukoil» and Victor Pinchuk. Channel employee in 
his anonymous interview said that it is a common 
wisdom among journalists that they can't criticize the 
President of Ukraine. During the presidential cam­
paign in 1999 the top management of the channel 
was replaced under the pressure of Presidential Ad­
ministration which appointed its «proxy» to control 
channel's activities. According to STB journalist, 
when a critical piece towards the President was aired, 
the channel was visited by the Presidential Admin­
istration officer who warned employees that they 
may follow Gongadze if they criticize the President 
in future. Given that Mr. Pinchuk has only recently 
become a channel owner, the journalist thinks that 
the change will only be to the worse. 
New Channel — controlled by Russian Alfa 
Bank and Ukraine's prime-minister Yushchenko. The 
journalist in anonymous interview said that the cen­
sorship had to be institutionalized before 1996, but 
it has become internalized by journalists since then. 
For the time being journalists know what the power 
elite wants them to do and obediently meet these 
demands. State institutions often ignore journalists 
request for information, especially in case of politi­
cal prisoners (for example, information on health 
condition of the imprisoned leader of UNA-UNSO 
Andriy Shkil who is accused of staging mass rallies 
on March 9 this year which turned violent). Classi­
cal external censorship has been replaced with self-
censorship, and the issues here is journalists' unwil­
lingness to deviate from power elite expectations. 
First National Channel — state owned channel 
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which serves as a Presidential mouth piece. Chan­
nel's President Vadim Dolganov has gained a noto­
rious reputation as a major actor in information wars 
and smear campaigns against opponents of the Presi­
dent of Ukraine. Ms. Lyudmyla Tomanyuk who works 
for the channel claimed that channel's employees 
never experienced any censorship, threats or pres­
sure. Nor had they any difficulties obtaining infor­
mation. This testimony was not surprising given the 
loyalty of the channel to the President. Ms. Toman­
yuk also denied existence of any form of censorship 
in Ukraine. Free lance journalist Volodymyr Skachko 
said that the power elite in Ukraine does not need to 
terrorize journalists since most of them have already 
been lured by attractive salary packages offered by 
tycoons owners media outlets. Given the conformi­
ty of journalists, mass media in post-Leninist Ukraine 
remain to be modified vehicle of propaganda and 
organization. According to Skachko, journalists know 
that their critically minded articles are unlikely to get 
published and this is the most effective censorship 
tool which precludes media people from writing such 
pieces. 
Oleh Liashko — editor-in-chief of the newspa­
per «Svoboda» («Liberty») — a project supported by 
the Radio Liberty. This newspaper was the first one 
to publish transcripts of conversations allegedly tak­
ing place between the President of Ukraine and his 
associates where they discussed how to get rid of 
Georgy Gongadze. In violation of a contact with the 
newspaper the printing house refused to print the 
issue of the newspaper containing transcripts. Mr. 
Liashko was also a publisher of an oppositional 
newspaper «Politika» («Politics») which was shut 
down by a court decision in May 1999. The official 
reason was the revelation of classified information, 
but commentators say that the real rational was the 
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critical position of the newspaper towards the Pres­
ident. According to Mr. Liashko, murders and threats 
against journalists have become a common place. 
Conclusion 
Speaking of a war against journalists as a socio­
political mechanism of control, I have been drawing 
upon Spinoza's criticism of Hobbes' theory of social 
order maintained by unlimited power of a sovereign — 
Leviathan. Spinoza pointed out in this respect that 
«about the state, subjects of which don't revolt with 
arms because of fear, we can say that there is no war 
going on in this state rather than its subjects enjoy 
peace. For the peace is not just the absence of war 
but virtue which arises from the strength of spirit... 
Besides, I would rather call the state where the peace 
depends on sluggishness of citizens who are being 
led as a livestock only to teach them how to subdue 
themselves, an uninhabited desert» [14]. Journalists' 
casualties are pretty numerous in this war — though 
no official statistics on the matter exists, Ukraine 
MPs inquiry to the secretary of the National Securi­
ty and Defense Council Yevhen Marchuk mentions 
dozens of murders and assaults against journalist 
[15]. (According to data provided by National Un­
ion of Journalists of Ukraine, 38 journalists died vi­
olently for ten years in independent Ukraine. In none 
of the cases the authorities recognized that the mur­
der was professionally/politically motivated (commu­
nication with Dr. Olexandr Beliakov, lecturer at the 
Institute of Journalism, Kyiv National University). 
Therefore, one can legitimately say that Ukrainian 
media obviously don't act under conditions of peace, 
rather there is a war going on and the state is either 
directly involved into encroachments on mass media 
freedom as well as lives of journalist or covers up 
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40 НАУКОВІ ЗАПИСКИ. Том 19. Соціологічні науки 
Русин Г. 
ДЕЯКІ АСПЕКТИ АНАЛІЗУ МЕХАНІЗМУ КОНТРОЛЮ 
МАСС-МЕДІА В УКРАЇНІ 
Стаття обговорює соціополітичні умови функціонування масс-медіа в неза­
лежній Україні. Використовуються дані інтерв'ю з журналістами та практиками 
ЗМІ задля підтвердження тези про те, що держава проголосила війну журналіс­
там для гарантування ефективного контролю над ними. 
